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ABSTRACT
Previous research regarding dehumanization has shown that individuals reserve
secondary emotions, which comprise the essence of being human, to fellow ingroup members
and ascribe primary emotions, which we share with animals, to outgroups. The current studies
sought to explore whether this bias is universal or is facilitated by social power. Studies 1 and 2
examined how White participants, whose dominant racial identity has been made salient,
attribute emotions across White and Black targets and found that White men primed with White
identity ascribed fewer secondary emotions to the Black target relative to the White target. Study
3 tested whether White men attribute emotions differently across White men and White women
when their identity as a man is activated, but the dominant identity prime yielded no differences
in secondary emotion designation across targets. Studies 4 and 5 were designed to determine
whether dehumanization was driven by dominant identities or general ingroup bias. Study 4
explored whether Black participants attribute fewer secondary emotions to White (vs. Black
targets) and study 5 tested whether White women attributed fewer secondary emotions to White
men (vs. White women) when their stigmatized identity was made accessible. For both studies,
no differences in secondary emotion attribution across targets emerged. Taken together, these
findings suggest that outgroup dehumanization is, at least partially, facilitated by social
dominance.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
White supremacist attitudes have persisted throughout American history. Despite the
emergence of progressive norms aimed at eradicating a racialized hierarchy, White
characteristics and ideology are still the virtuous default to which all others are compared
(Feagin, 2012). As a result, equal access to fundamental rights, resources and opportunities are
not afforded to everyone because many do not understand how intergroup attitudes favor White
individuals, despite the illegalization of overt racial discrimination laws during the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s (Gaertner & Dovido, 1986).
Further, the actions taken by minority groups to gain access to the rights enjoyed by
dominant group members are often interpreted by Whites as discrimination (DiAngelo, 2018).
For instance, the “Unite the Right” rally that took place in Charlottesville, Virginia transpired in
response to the removal of Confederate statues across the United States. During this event, White
supremacists, White nationalists, and Neo-nazis organized to “preserve White history” that they
perceived to be under attack and advocate their “right to exist (Elliott, 2019).” Such sentiments
are not consistent with typical White supremacist ideology; instead of expressing that Whites are
superior to all other races and ethnicities, demonstrators instead conveyed that they felt
stigmatized, themselves. However, it is possible that even though the beliefs currently expressed
by White supremacists are not explicitly prejudicial, members of these groups may still view
minority group members as inferior. Therefore, in light of the growing support for groups whose
objective is to “protect” against what is perceived to be an attack against White values, the
current research seeks to test the possibility that White individuals construe deviations from
White identity as substandard which may elicit emotions, cognitions, and behaviors that are
consistent with White supremacist attitudes.

2
The current research aims to examine whether the characterization of White supremacy
as the proactive degradation of people of color is accurate. Specifically, I wish to explore 1)
whether group identity can lead to the dehumanization of outgroup members, 2) if this
relationship is dependent on ingroup social power and 3) whether this process is specific to
racial/ethnic dominance or social dominance in general (e.g., gender dominance). Due to the
uniquely violent and oppressive history regarding Black Americans, I expect that the salience of
White participants’ dominant racial identity will cause these individuals to view Black people as
less human. This prospect corresponds with Group Position Theory (GPT; Blumer, 1958), which
recognizes how historical contexts and one’s position in the social hierarchy can affect
intergroup attitudes. In contrast, consistent with Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner,
1986) which proposes that all individuals are prone to outgroup derogation, it is possible that
group identity activation may cause everyone to dehumanize outgroup members, regardless of
their social power. The proceeding sections further delineate these theories as well as pertinent
social psychological theories of prejudice.
Prejudice
The proposed relationship explores why and how the derogation of outgroup members
has persisted, even though our current society claims to value egalitarian norms. Much research
regarding prejudice has demonstrated that we are inclined to favor the ingroup over the outgroup,
though the cause of this bias has been a matter of debate within the literature (Brewer, 1999).
Specifically, in line with SIT, some researchers view prejudicial attitudes to be a matter of
merely preferring those with whom we share similar identities and characteristics over those who
are different from us (Bobo, 1983), and that this ingroup favoritism allows for the maintenance
of social identity (Brewer, 1991), and is distinct from outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999).
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However, similar to GPT, others argue that such biases are driven more by specific attitudes
towards outgroups based on the historical treatment of said outgroup (Gaertner & Dovido, 1986).
For instance, Goodwin, Operario, and Fiske (1998) posited that factors such as power and
dominance enhance intergroup prejudice by increasing the likelihood that an outgroup will be
negatively stereotyped in order to justify existing group inequities. Therefore, even though we
are all motivated to favor the ingroup relative to the outgroup, this bias may be enhanced and be
more likely to lead to outgroup derogation for members of dominant groups.
Dehumanization. In order to test whether dominant ingroup identities facilitate outgroup
derogation, the current research relies on priming group identity and measuring subsequent
outgroup dehumanization, which is the denial of full humanness to others (Haslam, 2006).
Dehumanization is a particularly severe type of derogation; while both of these processes allow
us to view others as being inferior, outgroup derogation does not necessitate denying that these
outgroup members possess human qualities or characteristics. Said differently, dehumanization is
a specific form of derogation, but the derogation of others does not always result in
dehumanization. As such, the current research sought to explore outgroup dehumanization
insofar as it denotes an extreme manifestation of outgroup inferiority.
Recently, research has focused on how secondary emotions, which encompass the
essence of being fully human, are differently attributed to ingroup and outgroup members (for a
review, see Haslam, 2006). Specifically, Leyens et al. (2000) posited and provided support for
this process of infrahumanization, wherein we view outgroup members as less human than
ingroup members. This bias in emotion attribution is quite robust and has been found facilitate
discriminatory behavior (Pereira, Vala & Leyens, 2008; Vaes et al., 2003). Previous research
suggests that dehumanization is a crucial process to investigate concerning ethnicity and race;
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Boccato and colleagues (2007) used a person categorization task to explore the
infrahumanization of racial outgroups. Participants were presented with a “distractor” word
which was either a primary or secondary emotion, and then shown a photo of a Black or White
face and subsequently pressed a key indicating whether the image was of a Black or White
person. Keystroke latencies were the quickest when White participants were primed with
secondary emotions and asked to identify a White person, suggesting that respondents more
readily associated their ingroup with secondary emotions, relative to their outgroup.
The current research sought to extend the research regarding infrahumanization by
exploring how the salience of one's position in the social hierarchy affects the degree to which
we ascribe secondary emotions to ingroup versus outgroup members. In order to do so,
participants were exposed to their group identity (versus a control prime) and asked to attribute a
variety of emotions to either an ingroup or outgroup target. Because the attribution of primary
versus secondary emotions are not usually characterized as an indication of humanness outside
of social psychological research, the current methodology was adapted to reduce the likelihood
that results are affected by demand characteristics (Vaes et al., 2003). Consistent with SIT, it
could be the case that all ingroups whose group identity is made salient are equally likely to view
outgroups as possessing fewer secondary emotions.
Social Identity Theory
Previous research regarding infrahumanization has indicated that we tend to attribute
more secondary emotions to the ingroup, and reserve primary emotions, which are also ascribed
to animals, for the outgroup. This pattern is consistent with Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Specifically, SIT posits that one’s self-concept is often based upon group
membership, and such affiliations are an essential basis for one’s feelings of pride and self-
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esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Said differently, our sense of well-being is not only elicited by
how we feel we are doing as individuals, but how the groups with which we identify are faring as
well. As such, we seek to enhance our self-concept through intergroup comparison.
SIT was developed by Tajfel and Turner (1986) in order to understand social
categorization, perception, and intergroup conflict (Abrams & Hogg, 1999). Previous scholarship
has tested SIT in laboratory settings and revealed that intergroup biases take place even when
group membership is artificially constructed. For example, Tajfel and his colleagues (1979)
found that participants assigned to a group based upon false feedback about an arbitrary, minimal
characteristic (such as over or underestimating the number of dots on a screen or flipping a coin),
would often engage in outgroup discrimination even at a cost to their ingroup. That is, when
playing an economic game, most participants focused on their artificial outgroup receiving fewer
rewards rather than their ingroup receiving more resources (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979).
Such outcomes demonstrate that when groups compete for resources, they prefer competitors to
be as destitute as possible relative to their ingroup, which is best understood within the context of
intergroup threat; in order to increase the probability of victory in intergroup conflict, it is not
necessary to be well off in general, but better off than competitors.
Consistent with SIT, it is possible that all people who have their group identity activated
will display outgroup derogation through dehumanization. Namely, the results of the current
research may replicate that of previous research regarding infrahumanization and SIT such that
all participants, regardless of their place in the social hierarchy, primed with their ingroup
identity may view outgroup targets as less human relative to ingroup targets. However, because
of the stratification of power that exists in most societies, it is possible that being a part of a
group that is privy to seemingly legitimate social power may enhance this bias. As such, I expect
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that one’s position in the social hierarchy will magnify the inframahumanization bias that
emerged in previous research, a prospect consistent with many sociological theories and social
psychological research regarding ingroup bias and social power.
Social Identity and Power
According to Blumer (1958) in order to understand and explore racial prejudice in the
United States, the historical and political context surrounding these attitudes must be taken into
consideration. As such, he proposed that the negative emotions and discriminatory actions
against ethnic outgroups are a result of the perceived superiority of dominant group members, a
model he termed Group Position Theory (GPT). Said differently, it is not merely the fact that
White Americans harbor negative feelings toward minority groups because they are different;
instead it is the fact that Whites have been socialized to believe themselves to be superior to
these groups, and feelings of threat are produced if outgroup members do not behave in ways
that denote inferiority.
Specifically, Blumer (1958) proposed that there are four different beliefs facilitate racial
stigmatization. First, feelings of superiority by dominant group members must be present, which
are either implicitly and explicitly reinforced by societal institutions that favor the dominant
group. Second, the dominant group assumes that subordinate groups are dissimilar, which
prevents outgroup members from being entirely accepted by those atop the social hierarchy.
Further, GPT argues that seemingly legitimate claims of advantage must develop, and this
privilege gives way to the last step necessary to create racial prejudice: fear and suspicion that
the subordinate races want those privileges as well. This last phase creates the belief held by the
advantaged in society that subordinate groups should "know their place," which is at the bottom
of the societal hierarchy.
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Therefore, Blumer’s (1958) taxonomy of prejudice argues interracial hostility is the
product of America’s history of shaping group identities, stereotypes, and societal standards in a
way that benefits Whites and reinforces attitudes consistent with White superiority. Likewise,
White Racial Framing Theory (WRF; Feagin, 2012) posits that the assumption of racial
supremacy causes dominant group members to use their ingroup as the standard of comparison
for all other groups. WRF contends that White people see themselves as superior and righteous
while conceptualizing all racial “others” as inferior and morally corrupt. As such, this ideology
positions Whites as virtuous, White institutions as the pinnacle of achievement, and particularly
pertinent, Whiteness as emotionally normative. This dominant racial frame facilitates the
propagation of stereotypes and values, specifically the perception of normative (i.e., desirable)
racial identities and practices, as well as stigmatized (i.e., undesirable) racial identities and
practices. Said differently, White people have been socialized to view any deviation from their
own culture as inferior. Taken together, GPT and WRF posit that Whites have been socialized to
view their ingroup's values as righteous and are the standard to which the values of others are
measured, and deviations in values and beliefs are perceived to be inferior. Importantly, such
biases work to legitimize the existing social hierarchy that favors this dominant group, allowing
them to retain their social power.
Consistent with sociological theories regarding how dominant identities shape outgroup
perceptions, social psychological research has demonstrated that social power can significantly
influence how less powerful outgroup members are construed and understood (Brauer &
Bourhis, 2006). Previous research has defined social status as the relative position of groups on
valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and constitutes a group’s control of
the outcomes incurred by both the ingroup and outgroup (Jones, 1972). Those with high social
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status or power have been found to perceive outgroup members as consistent with negative
cultural stereotypes and view outgroups as threatening (Quillian, 1995; Pratto et al., 1994). For
instance, paralleling WRF, symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981) takes place when high-status
groups, such as White people, hold prejudicial attitudes toward Black people because of the
perception of inconsistent values which constitute a “symbolic threat” to traditional American
values. Further, Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) posits that intergroup
perception is affected by social power whereby dominant group members adopt prejudicial
attitudes that denigrate outgroups in order to legitimize their relatively dominant position.
In sum, research on intergroup relations has explored how ingroup favoritism and
outgroup derogation occur in both minimal and meaningful group situations and must be taken
into consideration when examining whether social power affects the dehumanization of
outgroups. While SIT focuses on how social identity, regardless of social power, can prompt
prejudice, GPT, and related theories emphasize and explore how historical and political factors
promote and reinforce anti-outgroup attitudes. Hence, the current research examines the
possibility that the dehumanization of outgroups is affected by the salience of one’s ingroup
identity. That is, I am investigating whether the activation of dominant identities, and by
extension, the accessibility of one's superior position in the social hierarchy, facilitates the
perception of outgroup members as less human.
Current Research
The aim of the current research sought to extend the research regarding
infrahumanization by exploring whether one’s position in the social hierarchy affects the degree
one will view the outgroup as less human. Consistent with SIT, it could be the case that all
ingroups are equally likely to view outgroups as possessing fewer essentially humanistic traits. In
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contrast, it is also possible that this bias may only manifest for those whose group is high on the
social hierarchy. In line with GTP, I anticipate that the activation of White identity, specifically,
will cause White participants to attribute fewer secondary emotions to Black targets (vs. White
targets). If such results emerge, it would suggest that, while previous research has evinced that
we are likely to favor the ingroup and derogate outgroup members in general, this pattern of
dehumanization is magnified for outgroups who have been historically stigmatized, such as
Black people in the United States.
In order to investigate whether dominant identities contribute to outgroup
dehumanization, I designed a paradigm in which participants were exposed to a prime activating
one’s racial/ethnic identity or gender identity (versus a control prime) and tested whether this
accessibility affected the degree to which participants perceived outgroup targets as human. In
order to measure dehumanization, participants read a vignette in which the main character
(target) was presented as either an ingroup or outgroup member and indicated to what extent they
saw the targets as feeling a variety of emotions. In particular, I explored how participants
attributed secondary emotions to these targets, and whether this attribution depended 1) on group
identity accessibility and 2) the social power afforded by the activated group identity. Due to the
current sociopolitical climate in this country, it is crucial now more than ever to understand how
attitudes consistent with White supremacy continue to exist despite the ostensibly progressive
norm of societal egalitarianism. Understanding whether social power and group identity enable
the dehumanization of outgroup members may give insight into this issue.
Overview of Studies
The following studies vary systematically in terms of participant group membership and,
by extension, identity activation and the presentation of ingroup versus outgroup targets. Because
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I am particularly interested in exploring subtle White supremacy, studies 1 and 2 examined how
White participants, whose dominant racial identity has been made salient, attribute secondary
emotions across White and Black targets. In study 1, I explored whether the relationship between
dominant racial identity and outgroup dehumanization differs across men and women; it could be
the case that the activation of White identity will not cause White women to dehumanize Black
targets because they possess a stigmatized identity in regard to their gender. Further, study 2,
explores this process among White men, exclusively. Further, in order to determine whether
outgroup dehumanization is driven by dominant identities, in general, or is specific to dominant
racial identities, study 3 tested whether White men will attribute secondary emotions differently
across White men and White women targets when their identity as a man is activated.
In contrast, studies 4 and 5 were designed to clarify the mechanism responsible for the
anticipated results in studies 1 – 3. In order to determine whether outgroup dehumanization is
driven by dominant identities specifically, or is simply a product of general ingroup bias, I used a
similar paradigm from the previous studies and examined dehumanization patterns in groups
who possess stigmatized identities. Study 4 explored whether Black participants attribute fewer
secondary emotions to White (vs. Black targets) and study 5 tested whether White women
attributed fewer secondary emotions to White men (vs. White women) when their stigmatized
identity was made accessible. While I do not expect these differences to emerge, significant
results would signify that outgroup dehumanization takes place as a function of social identity,
above and beyond social power.
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Chapter 2: Method
Study 1
Method
Participants
Two hundred ten participants (78 men and 132 women) were recruited from the Mturk
study pool. The mean age was 45.92 years (SD = 15.47). Seven participants were removed from
analyses because they did not identify as White. Further, nine participants were eliminated
because they only used one keystroke throughout the study. As will be described in the
procedure, participants responded to an attention check question after experiencing the priming
manipulation, and who failed this task were excluded from analyses. Therefore, the total number
sample size resulted in 135 (52 men and 83 women) with a mean age of 47.00 years (SD =
15.16).
Study Design
Study 1 is a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White identity] x Target Type [White, Black])
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a White
identity prime or a control prime. Following prime exposure, participants were asked to attribute
a variety of emotions to either a White (experimental n = 31; control n = 39) or a Black
(experimental n = 33; control n = 32) target described in a vignette. Specifically, I was interested
in how secondary emotion attribution varied across prime and target type among men and
women.
Procedure
Participants completed this study online using the platform offered by Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After giving consent,
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participants were told that this study investigated the relationship between the ability to
memorize images and text. Participants were then randomly exposed to one of two possible
primes. In the control condition, participants were shown ten different abstract pictures of black
and white geometric shapes (Appendix A). In the experimental condition, participants were
exposed to ten different black and white photos of White people from the 1950s, which were
selected to activate White identity, because the racial hierarchy was largely in favor of White
individuals (Appendix B). In both conditions, the images were each shown for ten seconds and
transitioned automatically. Following this portion of the study, participants indicated how many
images they viewed (i.e., 5, 10, 15, or 20), which served as an attention check measure.
The participants then read a vignette adapted from Srull and Wyer’s (1979) classic study,
which explored how priming affected the perception of aggression. Subsequently, participants
rated the main character on a variety of emotions as a way to determine the extent to which the
they dehumanized the target. In order to measure the extent to which participants dehumanized
the main character in the vignette, I presented participants with the list of primary and secondary
emotions developed by Leyens and colleagues (2001). The original essay read as follows:
I ran into my old acquaintance Donald the other day, and I decided to go over and visit
him, since by coincidence we took our vacations at the same time. Soon after I arrived, a
salesman knocked at the door, but Donald refused to let him enter. He also told me that
he was refusing to pay his rent until the landlord repaints his apartment. We talked for a
while, had lunch, and then went out for a ride. We used my car, since Donald 's car had
broken down that morning, and he told the garage mechanic that he would have to go
somewhere else if he couldn't fix his car that same day. We went to the park for about an
hour and then stopped at a hardware store. I was sort of preoccupied, but Donald bought
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some small gadget, and then I heard him demand his money back from the sales clerk. I
couldn't find what I was looking for, so we left and walked a few blocks to another store.
The Red Cross had set up a stand by the door and asked us to donate blood. Donald lied
by saying he had diabetes and therefore could not give blood. It's funny that I hadn't
noticed it before, but when we got to the store, we found that it had gone out of business.
It was getting kind of late, so I took Donald to pick up his car and we agreed to meet
again as soon as possible.
For this study, the main character, Donald, was replaced with one of two possible names: Jamal
(Black target) or Jerry (White target); which served as another manipulation designed to test
whether or not the White identity prime affected the degree to which participants dehumanized
ingroup vs. outgroup members.
After participants read through this vignette, they rated the main character on a variety of
primary and secondary emotions, which were either positive or negative in valence. Specifically,
participants indicated the capacity of the target to experience primary positive (happiness,
enjoyment, excitement, pleasure), primary negative (anger, fear, pain, fright), secondary positive
(hope, fascination, optimism, pride) and secondary negative emotions (greed, guilt, shame,
pessimism). After rating the Black or White target, participants then indicated their ethnicity and
the strength of their ethnic identification. Finally, participants responded to several different
psychological scales, were debriefed, and dismissed from the study.
Materials
During the experiment, participants were asked to complete a variety of scales including
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988;
Appendix F), the Neoliberal Beliefs Inventory (NBI; Bay-Cheng, Fitz, Alizaga, & Zucker, 2015;
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Appendix G), and the short form version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA;
Zakrisson, 2005; Appendix H). The PANAS is composed of two mood scales, each comprised of
10-items that measure the participants’ current experience of positive and negative affect.
Participants indicated to what extent they felt each emotion on a Likert-scale ranging from 1
(Very slightly or Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Example emotions include “interested,”
“distressed,” and “excited.”
In contrast, the NBI is a 27-item scale that was developed to assess neoliberal ideology,
including an emphasis on personal responsibility, individual freedoms, meritocracy and their
psychological effects. Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with each item on a
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (Very slightly or Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Example items include
“[d]iscrimination does not exist today to such a degree that affirmative action policies are
necessary” and “I think people imagine more barriers, such as discrimination, than actually
exist.”
Finally, the RWA short form is a 15-item scale designed to measure to what degree
participants: are submissive to authorities, are aggressive toward societal deviants, and value
traditions. Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with each item on a Likert-scale
ranging from 1 (Very slightly or Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Example items include “God’s laws
about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and such
violations must be punished” and “[o]ur country needs a powerful leader in order to destroy the
radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today." These scales were expected to provide
more information to elucidate how participants reacted to the manipulations.
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Hypotheses
In study 1, it was predicted that 1) those exposed to the White identity prime would
attribute fewer secondary emotions to the Black target relative to the White target. In contrast, I
expected 2) the control prime would elicit no differences in the attribution of secondary emotions
across target type. Further, I anticipated that 3) those exposed to the White identity prime,
compared to the control prime, would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the Black target.
Finally, I predicted that 4) the strength of participants’ White identity would moderate the
relationship between dominant identity salience and dehumanization of outgroup members.
Specifically, I expected that higher levels of White identification would result in greater
dehumanization the Black target when exposed to the White identity prime versus a control
prime.
Results
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for emotions are reported in Table 1.
Correlation coefficients between all of the emotions can be found in Table 2.
Primary Analyses
To test my primary hypotheses (1-3), I performed a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White
identity] x Target Type [White, Black]) between- subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Findings yielded no significant differences in secondary attribution across conditions.
Additionally, in order to test whether one's reported racial/ethnic identity moderated the
hypothesized relationship between prime and target type (hypothesis 4), I ran a 3-way (Prime
Type [control, White identity] x Target Type [White, Black] x Racial Identity Strength
interaction to determine whether the previously mentioned factors affected secondary emotion
attribution depending on the degree to which participants reported identifying with their
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race/ethnicity. This analysis revealed that secondary attribution did not change across conditions
depending on the strength of their ingroup identity.
Finally, I explored whether outgroup dehumanization patterns differed by gender. To test
this possibility, I ran a 2 X 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White identity] x Target Type [White,
Black] x Gender [men, women]) which revealed significant differences in secondary emotions
attribution across conditions, F (1, 127) = 4.01, p = .047. Consistent with hypothesis 1, simple
slope analyses revealed that White men exposed to the White prime attributed marginally fewer
secondary emotions to the Black target (M = 1.81, SD = 0.39) than the White target (M = 2.22,
SD = 0.47), t (134) = 1.73, p = .085 (Figure 1). In line with hypothesis 2, there were no
differences in secondary emotion attribution across targets for those exposed to the control
prime, t (134) = 0.98, p = .324 (Figure 2). Moreover, consistent with my third hypothesis, men
attributed fewer secondary emotions when exposed to the White identity prime (M = 1.85, SD =
0.39) relative to the control prime (M = 2.31, SD = 0.65), t (134) = 2.31, p = .022 when presented
with the Black target, while no differences emerged across prime conditions for the White target.
Exploratory Analyses
Descriptive and inferential statistic information regarding all other types of emotions are
listed in Table 3. Participants reported marginal differences across conditions for primary,
positive, and primary positive emotions and are explained in further detail below. Differences
across conditions for negative emotions, in general, and secondary negative emotions were not
significant and thus will not be discussed further.
Primary emotions. As can be seen in Table 4 as well as Figures 5 and 6, simple slope
analyses revealed that White men exposed to the control prime attributed more of primary
emotions when the was Black compared to when the target was White. Similar to the attribution
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of secondary emotions, White men exposed to the White identity prime attributed fewer primary
emotions to the Black target, relative to those exposed to the control prime. Moreover, men and
women exposed to the control prime differed in how they attributed primary emotions across
targets; when presented with the White target, there was no gender difference in emotion
attribution (Men: M = 1.76, SD = 0.39; Women: M = 1.89, SD = 1.09), however, when presented
with the Black target, men attributed more primary emotions (M = 2.15, SD = 0.70) than women
(M = 1.68, SD = 0.38), t (134) = -2.39, p = .018 (see Figures 3 and 4).
Positive emotions. As can be seen in Table 5 as well as Figures 6 and 7, simple slope
analyses revealed that men exposed to the White identity prime attributed fewer positive
emotions to the Black target relative to those exposed to the control prime. Additionally, men
and women exposed to the control prime differed in how they attributed positive emotions across
targets; when presented with the Black target, men attributed more positive emotions (M = 1.86,
SD = 0.92) than women (M = 1.34, SD = 0.34), however, when presented with the White target,
there was no gender difference in emotion attribution (Men: M = 1.53, SD = 0.48; Women: M =
1.56, SD = 0.69), t (134) = -1.93, p = .056. Finally, gender moderated how prime exposure
affected positive emotion attribution toward the Black target, such that when exposed to the
White identity prime, no differences in positive emotion attribution emerged (Men: M = 1.38, SD
= 0 36; Women: M = 1.36, SD = 0.41), whereas exposure to the control prime caused men to
attribute marginally more emotions (M = 1.86, SD = 0.92) than women (M = 1.34, SD = 0.34), t
(134) = 1.75, p = .081.
Primary positive emotions. As can be seen in Table 6 as well as Figure 7 and 8, simple
slope analyses exploring primary positive emotions revealed that men exposed to the control
prime attributed marginally more primary positive emotions to the Black target than the White
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target. Also, men exposed to the White prime attributed marginally fewer primary positive
emotions to the Black target relative to those exposed to the control prime. Further, men and
women exposed to the control prime differed in how they attributed primary positive emotions
across targets, such that when presented to the when presented with the Black target, men
attributed more primary positive emotions (M = 1.76, SD = 0.98) than women (M = 1.25, SD =
0.85), however there was no gender difference in emotion attribution to the White target (Men:
M = 1.33, SD = 0.33; Women: M = 1.48, SD = 0.81), t (134) = -2.22, p = .029.
Discussion
My primary hypotheses that participants would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the
Black target (vs. the White target) when exposed to the White identity prime (vs. the control
prime) was supported, but only among White men. In light of previous research associating the
attribution of fewer secondary emotions with the dehumanization of outgroup members, the
current results suggest that the activation one's dominant racial identity may cause White men to
view Black men as less human relative ingroup members.
There was no effect of prime on the dehumanization of outgroup targets for White
women. While I did expect this pattern to emerge, there are both theoretical and methodological
explanations for why it did not occur. Theoretically, it is possible that dominant racial identity
does not cause White women to dehumanize Black men because being stigmatized based upon
one's gender interferes with this process. Said differently, perhaps this pattern was only
expressed by White men because they are often highest on the social hierarchy. In contrast, it
could be possible that findings were a product of the methodological approach. That is, relative
to the present, White women in the 1950s experienced more oppression, and therefore using
pictures from this era may have made their stigmatized group identity accessible, rather than a
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dominant identity. Future research should utilize different stimuli to prime White identity in
women to determine whether the current results are driven by gender differences or a
methodological limitation.
The current study provides some evidence that dominant identities may promote
outgroup dehumanization. Whether or not this process is due to dominant identities, in general,
or is specific to dominant racial/ethnic identities remains unclear. Given the diverging results in
regard to gender, study 2 further examines the association between dominant identity activation
and dehumanization among White men, only.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Two hundred sixty participants were recruited from the Mturk study pool. The mean age
was 46.42 years (SD = 16.62). However, 19 participants were removed from analyses because
they indicated they were not White men and 13 participants were eliminated because they only
used one keystroke throughout the study. Further, participants who failed the attention check
were excluded from analyses. Therefore, the final sample size resulted in 179 White men whose
mean age was 46.99 years (SD = 16.38).
Study Design
Similar to the previous study, Study 2 is comprised of a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control,
White man identity] x Target Type [White, Black]) between-subjects factorial design.
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a White man identity prime or a control
prime. Following prime exposure, participants were asked to attribute a variety of emotions to
either a White (experimental n = 43; control n = 41) or a Black (experimental n = 53; control n =
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42) target described in a vignette. Specifically, I was interested in how secondary emotion
attribution varied across prime and target type.
Procedure
Participants completed this study online using the platform offered by Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After giving consent,
participants were told that this study investigated the relationship between the ability to
memorize images and text. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
primes. The control prime was identical to that of the first study (Appendix A). In the
experimental condition, participants were exposed to ten different black and white photos of
White men during the '50s, '60s, '70s, and '80s (Appendix C). In both conditions, the images
were shown for ten seconds each and transitioned automatically. Following this portion of the
study, participants indicated how many images they viewed (i.e., 5, 10, 15, or 20), which served
as an attention check measure.
The next part of the study paralleled that of study 1. Participants read through a vignette
that featured a target who was either named Jamal (Black target) or Jerry (White target), who
they rated on a variety of primary and secondary emotions. After rating the Black or White
target, participants then indicated their ethnicity and the strength of their ethnic identification.
Finally, participants responded to several different psychological scales, were debriefed, and
dismissed from the study.
Materials
The materials used for this study were the same as those used in the previous study.
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Hypotheses
Consistent with study 1, it was predicted that 1) those exposed to the White man identity
prime would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the Black target relative to the White target.
In contrast, I expected that 2) the control prime would elicit no differences in the attribution of
secondary emotions across target type. Further, I anticipated that 3) those exposed to the White
man identity prime, compared to the control prime, would attribute fewer secondary emotions to
the Black target. Finally, I predicted that 4) the strength of participants’ White identity would
moderate the relationship between dominant identity salience and dehumanization of the Black
target. Specifically, I expected that higher levels of White identification would result in greater
dehumanization toward the Black target when exposed to the White identity prime versus a
control prime.
Results
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for emotions are reported in Table 7.
Correlation coefficients between all of the emotions can be found in Table 8.
Primary Analyses
To test my primary hypotheses (1-3), I performed a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White
man identity] x Target Type [White, Black]) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Findings yielded no significant differences in secondary attribution across conditions.
Additionally, in order to test whether one's reported racial/ethnic identity moderated the
hypothesized relationship between prime and target type (hypothesis 4), I ran a 3-way (Prime
Type [control, White identity] x Target Type [White, Black] x Racial Identity Strength
interaction. This analysis revealed that secondary attribution did not change across conditions
depending on the strength of their White man ingroup identity.
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Exploratory Analyses
I ran all of the abovementioned analyses to test whether prime type and target type
interacted to cause differences in the attribution of all other emotions. No significant interactions
emerged. However, a t-test revealed that participants attributed emotions differently across target
type, but this was not dependent on the prime to which they were exposed. Specifically, White
men attributed more positive and fewer negative emotions to the Black target than the White
target. As can be seen in Table 9, which displays the mean, standard deviation, t and p values for
these analyses, similar patterns emerged for both primary and secondary types of positive and
negative emotions.
Discussion
My primary hypotheses that participants would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the
Black target (vs. the White target) when exposed to the White man identity prime (vs. the control
prime) were not supported. One pattern that did emerge was that participants attributed greater
positive emotions to the Black target (vs. the White target) and greater negative emotions to the
White target (vs. the Black target), regardless of the prime type. This pattern could be indicative
of demand characteristics, such that participants who were exposed to the experimental prime
and subsequently presented with the Black target suspected that the purpose of this study was to
investigate racial bias and were more motivated to report that they saw this target in the best
possible light. However, another explanation for this finding is that, in light of the current
sociopolitical climate, White men have become more aware of group inequities and their
privilege. As a result, it is possible that accessibility of one’s White man identity may prompt
this particular group to view their outgroup as more positive and less negative than they would
have otherwise, perhaps out of guilt. Future research should explore these possibilities.
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The current study failed to replicate the findings from study 1, which may due to the
different experimental prime used in study 2. Specifically, the prime in the current study was
designed to evoke the participants' dominant identity utilized images containing only White men
across several different decades, rather than White men and women during the 1950s. Perhaps
the outgroup dehumanization that emerged in study 1 is specific to dominant racial identities and
not dominant identities, in general. Therefore, study 3 tested this possibility by investigating
whether the activation of a dominant gender identity, rather than a dominant racial identity,
causes White men to dehumanize of outgroup members (e.g., women).
Study 3
Method
Participants
Two hundred ten participants were recruited from the Mturk study pool. The mean age
was 53.56 years (SD = 16.48). However, 11 participants were removed from analyses because
they indicated they were not White men and two participants were eliminated because they only
used one keystroke throughout the study. Further, participants who failed the attention check
were also excluded from analyses. Therefore, the final sample size resulted in 130 White men
whose mean age was 53.68 years (SD = 16.15).
Study Design
Study 3 is a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White man identity] x Target Type [White man,
White woman]) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to
receive either a White man identity prime or a control prime. It should be noted that, although
the purpose of this study was to explore how dominant gender identity affects outgroup
dehumanization, I limited the scope of this test to White men in order to ensure an effective
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experimental prime as well as to disambiguate the results. Following prime exposure,
participants were asked to attribute a variety of emotions to either a White man (experimental n =
35; control n = 28) or White woman (experimental n = 32; control n = 35) target described in a
vignette. Specifically, I was interested in how secondary emotion attribution varied across prime
and target type.
Procedure
Participants completed this study online using the platform offered by Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After giving consent,
participants were told that this study investigated the relationship between the ability to
memorize images and text. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
primes. The primes were identical to those used in the previous study (Appendix A and C). In
both conditions, the images were shown for ten seconds and transitioned automatically.
Following this portion of the study, participants indicated how many images they viewed (i.e., 5,
10, 15, or 20), which served as an attention check measure.
The next part of the study was similar to the previous studies with the exception that a
White woman target replaced the Black target. Specifically, participants read through a vignette
that featured a target who was either a White woman (Julie) or White man (Jerry). Afterward,
they rated the target on a variety of primary and secondary emotions. Participants then indicated
their gender as well as to what extent they identify on this domain. Finally, participants
responded to several different psychological scales, were debriefed, and dismissed from the
study.
Materials
The materials used for this study were the same as those used in the previous studies.

25
Hypotheses
Consistent with the previous studies, it was predicted that 1) those exposed to the White
man identity prime would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the White woman target relative
to the White man target. In contrast, I expected 2) the control prime would elicit no differences
in the attribution of secondary emotions across target type. Further, I anticipated that 3) those
exposed to the White man identity prime, compared to the control prime, would attribute fewer
secondary emotions to the White woman target. Finally, I predicted that 4) the strength of
participants’ gender identity would moderate the relationship between identity salience and
dehumanization of White women. Specifically, I expected that higher levels of gender
identification would result in greater dehumanization of the White woman target when exposed
to the White man identity prime versus a control prime.
Results
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for emotions are reported in Table 10.
Correlation coefficients between all of the emotions can be found in Table 11.
Primary Analyses
To test my primary hypotheses (1-3), I performed a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White
man identity] x Target Type [White man, White woman]) between-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Findings yielded no significant differences in secondary emotion attribution across
conditions. Additionally, in order to test whether one's reported gender identity moderated the
hypothesized pattern (hypothesis 4), I ran a 3-way (Prime Type [control, White man identity] x
Target Type [White man, White woman] x Gender Identity Strength interaction. This analysis
revealed that secondary attribution did not vary across conditions depending on ingroup identity.
Exploratory Analyses
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I ran all of the abovementioned analyses to test whether prime type and target type
interacted to cause differences in the attribution of any emotion. No significant interactions
emerged. However, a t-test revealed that participants did attribute emotions differently across
prime type, but this was not dependent on target exposure. Specifically, White men exposed to
the White man identity prime attributed more primary, secondary and positive emotions to both
targets, relative to those exposed to the control prime. See Table 12 for the specific mean,
standard deviation, t and p values for these analyses.
Discussion
My primary hypotheses that participants would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the
White woman target (vs. the White man target) when exposed to the White man identity prime
(vs. the control prime) was not supported; no differences in either secondary emotions or primary
emotions materialized across conditions. One pattern that did emerge was that participants
exposed to the White man identity prime attributed more primary, secondary, and positive
emotions to targets, regardless of target type. Such results suggest that the activation of dominant
racial and gender identities cause White men to see other White individuals, regardless of their
gender, as more human and perceive them in a more positive light.
As stated before, the first three studies tested whether dominant identities prompt
outgroup dehumanization. However, in order to determine whether the results of study 1 were
exclusive to dominant identities, this process must be tested for groups with stigmatized
identities. That is, without using a similar paradigm for participants who have non-dominant
identities, it would be difficult to ascertain whether one's group position in the social hierarchy or
social identity, in general, were responsible for the previous findings. Therefore, studies 4 and 5
were designed to clarify the mechanism driving the results that emerged in study 1. Specifically,
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study 4 was designed to parallel study 1 in that it tested whether Black participants would
attribute fewer secondary emotions to the White target (vs. Black target) when primed with their
Black identity.
Study 4
Method
Participants
Two hundred six participants (96 men and 110 women) were recruited from the Mturk
study pool. The mean age was 40.37 years (SD = 15.94). However, five participants were
removed from analyses because they indicated they were not Black, and two participants were
eliminated because they only used one keystroke throughout the study. Further, participants who
failed the attention check were excluded from analyses. Therefore, the actual sample size
resulted in 133 (57 men and 76 women) whose mean age was 40.18 years (SD = 15.49).
Study Design
Study 4 is a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, Black identity] x Target Type [Black, White])
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a Black
identity prime or a control prime. Following prime exposure, participants were asked to attribute
a variety of emotions to either a Black (experimental n = 31; control n = 38) or White
(experimental n = 30; control n = 34) target described in a vignette. Specifically, I was interested
in how secondary emotion attribution varied across prime and target type among men and
women.
Procedure
Participants completed this study online using the platform offered by Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After giving consent,
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participants were told that this study investigated the relationship between the ability to
memorize images and text. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
possible primes. The control prime was identical to that in the previous studies (Appendix A). In
the experimental condition, participants were exposed to ten different black and white photos of
Black people from the 1950s (Appendix D). In both conditions, the images were shown for ten
seconds and transitioned automatically. Following this portion of the study, participants
indicated how many images they viewed (i.e., 5, 10, 15, or 20), which served as an attention
check measure.
The next part of the study was identical to that of studies 1 and 2. Participants read
through a vignette that featured a Black (Jamal) or White (Jerry) target. Afterward, they rated the
main character on a variety of primary and secondary emotions. Participants then indicated their
ethnicity as well as to what extent they identify on this domain. Finally, participants responded to
several different psychological scales, were debriefed, and dismissed from the study.
Materials
The materials used for this study were the same as those used in the previous studies.
Hypotheses
Unlike studies 1 - 3, I do not expect any differences in target emotion attribution across
prime type. Even though the anticipation of null results is atypical in social psychological
research, it was essential to run this study to determine whether the pattern that emerged in study
1 was due to dominant identity or social identities, in general. That is, if the results in this study
reflected study 1 results, such an outcome would suggest that people, in general, are likely to
dehumanize outgroups when their ingroup identity is accessible, regardless of their position in
the social hierarchy.
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Results
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for emotions are reported in Table 13.
Correlation coefficients between all of the emotions can be found in Table 14.
Primary Analyses
To test my primary hypothesis, I performed a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, Black identity]
x Target Type [Black, White]) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). Consistent with
my hypothesis, prime yielded no differences in secondary emotion attribution across targets.
Additionally, I tested whether one's racial/ethnic identity moderated the relationship between
prime and target type. To do so, I ran a 3-way (Prime Type [control, Black identity] x Target
Type [Black, White] x Racial Identity Strength interaction to determine whether the previously
mentioned factors affected secondary emotion attribution. This analysis revealed that secondary
attribution did not change across conditions depending on ingroup identity. Finally, I ran a 2 X 2
X 2 Prime Type [control, Black identity] x Target Type [White, Black] x Gender [men, women])
between-subjects ANOVA. No differences in secondary emotion attribution across conditions
emerged.
Exploratory Analyses
I ran a two-way (Prime Type [control, Black identity] x Target Type [Black, White])
between-subjects ANOVA for all other emotion types, which yielded marginal differences for
primary positive attribution, F (1, 129) = 3.041, p = .084. Differences in all other emotions were
not significant. Specifically, participants exposed to the Black identity prime (M = 1.63, SD =
0.63) attributed fewer primary positive emotions to the White target than those exposed to the
control prime (M = 2.15, SD = 1.15), t (131) = 2.26, p = .026. No difference emerged across
prime type (control prime: M = 1.76, SD = 0.79; experimental prime: M = 1.78, SD = 0.94) in
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primary positive emotion attribution toward the Black target, t (131) = -0.88, p = .380.
Additionally, when exposed to the control prime, participants attributed marginally fewer
emotions to the Black target (M = 1.76, SD = 0.79) than the White target (M = 2.15, SD = 1.15), t
(131) = 1.79, p = .076.
Further, I ran a 2 X 2 X 2 Prime Type [control, White identity] x Target Type [White,
Black] x Gender [men, women]) between-subjects ANOVA, which clarified the previously
described results. Analyses revealed that men and women exhibited marginally different primary
positive emotion attribution patterns across conditions, F (1, 129) = 2.81, p = .096. As can be
seen in Figure 10 and 11, simple slope analyses revealed that men presented with the White
target attributed marginally fewer primary positive emotions after being exposed to the Black
identity prime (M = 1.56, SD = 0.43) relative to the control prime (M = 2.23, SD = 1.12), t (131)
= 1.90, p = .060. Further, men exposed to the Black identity prime attributed fewer of these
emotions to the White target (M = 1.56, SD = 0.43) than the Black target (M = 2.38, SD = 0.96), t
(131) = -2.48, p = .015. These patterns did not emerge for women.
In fact, the gender difference across targets when exposed to the Black identity prime was
significant such that, when presented with the Black target, men attributed more primary positive
emotions (M = 2.98, SD = 0.96) than women (M = 1.25, SD = 0.51), however, when presented
with the White target there was no gender difference in emotion attribution (Men: M = 1.56, SD
= 0.43; Women: M = 1.68, SD = 0.75), t (131) = -2.83, p = .005. Finally, men and women
presented with the Black target differed in how they attributed primary positive emotions across
prime type; as previously stated, when exposed to the Black identity prime men attributed more
of these emotions than women, but when exposed to the control prime, this difference disappears
(Men: M = 1.97, SD = 0.85; Women: M = 1.61, SD = 0.74), t (131) = 1.89, p = .062.
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Discussion
My primary hypothesis that Black participants would not attribute secondary emotions
differently across Black and White targets when exposed to their racial/ethnic identity was
supported. However, consistent with study 1, participants did attribute primary positive emotions
differently across conditions, such that those exposed to their racial identity (vs. the control
prime) attributed fewer of these emotions to the outgroup target. Further, analyses revealed a
gender difference in how participants attributed these primary positive emotions across
conditions, such that Black men were responsible for the previously described relationship;
Black women did not attribute these emotions to the White target differently depending on prime
type. While Black men did not ascribe fewer secondary emotions to the White target, they do
seem to view this racial outgroup as possessing fewer primary positive emotions. Such results
may suggest that racial identity activation may cause Black men to engage in outgroup
derogation, rather than outgroup dehumanization.
Similar to the current study, study 5 was designed to parallel study 3 in that it tested
whether White women, a stigmatized group, would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the
White man target (vs. White woman target) when primed with their White woman identity.
Study 5
Method
Participants
Two hundred ten participants White women were recruited from the Mturk study pool.
The mean age was 45.94 years (SD = 16.04). However, eight participants were removed from
analyses because they indicated they were not White women. Further, three participants were
eliminated because they only used one keystroke throughout the study. Further, participants who
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failed the attention check were excluded from analyses. Therefore, the actual sample size
resulted in 146 White women whose mean age was 47.03 (SD = 15.74).
Study Design
Study 1 is a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White woman identity] x Target Type [White
woman, White man]) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to
receive either a White woman identity prime or a control prime. Following prime exposure,
participants were asked to attribute a variety of emotions to either a White woman (experimental
n = 47; control n = 30) or a White man (experimental n = 31; control n = 38) target described in a
vignette. Specifically, I was interested in how secondary emotion attribution varied across prime
and target type.
Procedure
Participants completed this study online using the platform offered by Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After giving consent,
participants were told that this study investigated the relationship between the ability to
memorize images and text. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
possible primes. The control prime was identical to that in the previous studies (Appendix A). In
the experimental condition, participants were exposed to ten different black and white photos of
White women during the '50s, '60s, 70's, and 80's (Appendix E). In both conditions, the images
were shown for ten seconds and transitioned automatically. Following this portion of the study,
participants indicated how many images they viewed (i.e., 5, 10, 15, or 20), which served as an
attention check measure.
The next part of the study was identical to that of study 3. Participants read through the
same vignette that featured either a White woman (Julia) or White man (Jerry) target. Afterward
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they rated the target on a variety of primary and secondary emotions. Participants then indicated
their gender as well as to what extent they identify on this domain. Finally, participants
responded to several different psychological scales, were debriefed, and dismissed from the
study.
Materials
The materials used for this study were the same as those used in the previous studies.
Hypotheses
Consistent with study 4, I do not expect any differences in target emotion attribution
across prime type.
Results
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for emotions are reported in Table 15.
Correlation coefficients between all of the emotions can be found in Table 16.
Primary Analyses
To test my primary hypothesis, I performed a 2 X 2 (Prime Type [control, White woman
identity] x Target Type [White man, White woman]) between-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Findings yielded no significant differences in secondary emotion attribution across
conditions. Additionally, I ran a 3-way (Prime Type [control, White woman identity] x Target
Type [White woman, White man] x Gender Identity Strength interaction. This analysis revealed
that secondary attribution did not change across conditions depending on the strength of one’s
gender identity.
Exploratory Analyses
I ran all of the abovementioned analyses to test whether the prime type and target type
interacted to cause differences in the attribution of any emotion. No significant interactions
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emerged. However, a t-test revealed that participants did attribute secondary positive emotions
differently across prime type, but this was not dependent on the target to which they were
exposed. Specifically, participants exposed to the White woman identity prime attributed more
secondary positive emotions (M = 1.64, SD = .76) to targets relative to those exposed to the
control prime (M = 1.45, SD = .59), t (189.53) = -2.02, p = .045. Further, participants did
attribute primary emotions, positive emotions, primary positive emotions, and secondary positive
emotions differently across target type, but this was not dependent on the prime to which they
were exposed. Specifically, White women attributed fewer of these emotions to the White man
target than the White woman target. Please see Table 17 for the specific mean, standard
deviation, t and p values for these analyses.
Discussion
My primary hypothesis that White women would not attribute secondary emotions
differently across White men and White women targets when exposed to their gender identity
was supported. However, participants whose White woman identity was salient (vs. not)
attributed more secondary positive emotions to targets, regardless of target type. This pattern
may suggest that the activation of one’s gender identity for White woman causes them to view
other White people, or possibly people in general, as slightly more human.
Further, participants did attribute more primary emotions, positive emotions, primary
positive emotions, and secondary positive emotions to the White woman target relative to the
White man target, but this was not dependent on prime exposure. Such results could be
interpreted in a variety of ways. First, this pattern may be suggestive of a general ingroup bias
such that White women view those that share these characteristics as possessing more positive
emotions than White men. In contrast, it is possible that women attributed these emotions
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differently across targets to reflect a cultural stereotype concerning gender and emotion (i.e., men
are less emotional than women).
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Chapter 3: General Discussion
The current research examined how group-based social power affects the perception of
outgroup members. Studies 1-3 tested whether the activation of dominant group (i.e,race and
gender) identity caused the dehumanization of outgroup targets. I expected that White
individuals (study 1) and White men (studies 2 and 3) who were exposed to their dominant racial
identity would attribute fewer secondary emotions to the Black target relative to the White target.
Study 1 provided partial support for these hypotheses, such that White men attributed fewer
secondary emotions to the Black target (vs. the White target) when exposed to the White identity
prime (vs. the control prime). However, inconsistent with expectations, this pattern did not
emerge for White women. This finding was not replicated in study 2, although White men did
attribute more positive and fewer negative emotions to the Black target (vs. the White target)
regardless of the prime to which they were exposed. The results that emerged in study 3 were
also inconsistent with hypotheses, such that participants exposed to the White man identity prime
attributed more primary, secondary and positive emotions to targets, regardless of the target’s
gender.
Studies 4 and 5 were designed to determine whether the outgroup dehumanization, which
occurred in study 1, was due to the activation of an identity that is associated with social power,
rather than a product of group identification in general. Consistent with hypotheses, neither
Black participants (study 4) nor White women (study 5) attributed fewer secondary emotions to
their outgroup targets when exposed to their stigmatized identity. However, in study 4, Black
men attributed fewer primary positive emotions to the White target when exposed to their racial
identity. In study 5, participants whose White woman identity was salient (vs. not) attributed
more secondary positive emotions to targets, regardless of target type. Additionally, White
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women attributed more primary emotions, positive emotions, primary positive emotions and
secondary positive emotions to the White woman target relative to the White man target, but this
was not related to prime type.
In light of previous research on dehumanization, which has established that secondary
emotions are reserved mainly for ingroup members rather than outgroup members, results from
studies 1, 4, and 5 suggest this process may be at least partially driven by social power. Said
differently, the inclination to view the outgroup as less human is facilitated by one’s membership
to a group that has been socialized to believe that they are superior to those who do not share this
dominant identity. Such a tendency was not detected for participants whose stigmatized identity
was activated, suggesting that outgroup dehumanization is not a consequence of social identity in
general, but social identities that are indicative of societal power. Consistent with research on
SDT, this tendency may take place to legitimize one’s position of power in the social hierarchy
and retain the privileges that it affords (Brauer & Bourhis, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994). If this is the
case, future research should explore whether increases in individual and collective self-esteem
moderates the relationship between dominant identity accessibility and outgroup
dehumanization.
As stated before, there are both theoretical and methodological explanations as to why the
activation of White identity did not cause the dehumanization of Black targets for White women.
Methodologically, it could be that the exposure to photos of White individuals in the 1950s did
not activate a dominant identity, but rather a stigmatized identity since women's rights were
relatively restricted during that period. In contrast, it could be because women often experience
discrimination based on gender, the activation of a dominant racial identity does not function
similarly for men and women. That is, perhaps having a stigmatized group-based identity in one
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domain interrupts the tendency of viewing the outgroup as less than human when social
dominance in another domain is activated. Future research should parse out these possibilities.
Notably, study 1 results were not replicated in study 2, which could be due to a variety of
reasons. First, this could be an indication that the findings which emerged in study 1 were an
aberration and do not reflect actual intergroup perception processes. In contrast, the fact that the
stimuli used in study 2 to prime identity worked to activate both one’s identity as a White person
and a man rather than White identity in isolation could have thwarted the tendency to
dehumanize the Black target. Participants in this study viewed Black targets as more positive and
less negative than White targets, which may reflect White culpability. That is, in the recent past,
White men have become more aware of group inequities, and the accessibility of one's dominant
racial and gender identities may have galvanized this awareness and caused participants to
overcompensate and adjust their outgroup perceptions to be in a way to alleviate the guilt of this
oppression.
Additionally, the photos in study 1 utilized images of White individuals during the 1950s
exclusively, while study 2 stimuli included photos of White people across different decades.
Therefore, it could be that the activation of one's identity in a hegemonic context that is
responsible for the subsequent outgroup dehumanization that ensued in study 1, rather than
White identity in isolation. Namely, the first study used photographs depicting an era where, due
to the impenitent institutionalization of discrimination and oppression, Whites experienced more
privilege and had less competition with people of color. Therefore, the prime developed for study
1 may have activated White dominance, while the photos in study 2 did not, which led to the
diverging patterns of dehumanization. If this is the case, it does not detract from the importance
of study 1 results. For instance, the current president of the United States often propagates
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imagery that suggests White dominance (e.g., the campaign slogan "Make America Great
Again,"; Confessore, 2016). In light of the current research, the use of such messages may work
to cause White men, particularly, to dehumanize people of color.
Limitations. There were several methodological limitations to the current research. First,
as mentioned in the discussion of study 1 findings, the stimuli used to prime group identity was
somewhat arbitrary, making the interpretation of the results challenging. Specifically, the failed
replication of study 1 results in study 2 raises concerns as to whether White identity was
responsible for outgroup dehumanization because the primes in both studies utilized photos of
White individuals. Further, after experiencing both manipulations, participants indicated to what
degree they identified with their ingroup, and statistical analyses established that this did not
differ depending on the prime condition they experienced. Said differently, the fact that
participants exposed to photos of White individuals did not report having a higher White identity
could be interpreted as a failed manipulation check. Finally, the fact that White men did not
dehumanize White women after being exposed to the White man identity prime may be due to
the fact that Whiteness was activated by the photos as well as gender. It is possible that
participants’ gender identity was superseded by their racial identity, causing participants to view
both targets as ingroup members. Therefore, future research should utilize different methods to
activate group identity to determine the validity of the current results.
Similarly, participants reported to what degree they identified with their ingroup in order
to determine whether identification strength affected the degree to which he or she dehumanized
outgroup targets. The insignificant findings may be due to the study design: participants were
asked to indicate the strength of their group identity after they had experienced both the prime
and target manipulation, potentially impacting their response. This decision was caused by the
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fact that the Mturk platform does not allow for prescreening questions outside of the context of
the specific study in which they are participating, and I wanted to avoid informing the
participants about the actual purpose of the study. Future research should utilize prescreening
measures outside of the study in order to determine whether the strength of one's ingroup identity
affects outgroup dehumanization.
Finally, previous research on dehumanization has historically used implicit measures to
determine emotion attribution patterns of ingroup versus outgroup members (Leyens et al.,
2000). Since I was not able to implement this task online, I utilized an explicit measurement of
dehumanization, which may have introduced the possibility of demand characteristics. The fact
that White men ascribed more positive and fewer negative emotions to the Black target (versus
the White target) in study 2 suggests that this may be the case. However, the expected pattern of
dehumanization that transpired in study 1 may indicate that this tendency is quite strong; explicit
measurement of emotion attribution across groups may work as a more conservative test of
dehumanization. Nevertheless, future research should explore how identity salience affects the
implicit attribution of secondary emotions across ingroup and outgroup targets.
A future study that may work to build upon and test the validity of the results of the
current research may try to prime characteristics of various groups rather than using photographs
of specific group members (Chiao et al., 2006). For instance, a potential study may use words to
prime characteristics of both gender and race and then assess outgroup dehumanization using
implicit measures. Specifically, this study would utilize a 2 (Gender [men, women]) X 2 (Race
[Black, White]) where characteristics associated with the corresponding groups will be used to
prime specific group membership (which will be determined through pre-testing). Further,
ingroup membership should be measured both during prescreening and as a manipulation check
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to determine whether 1) initial group identity affects the relationship between identity salience
and dehumanization and 2) the identity prime is effective.
Final Remarks. Despite the recent shift in norms that promote egalitarianism and
discourage prejudice, attitudes consistent with White supremacy in the United States have
endured (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). One explanation for this persistence is the fact that
membership to a powerful social group elicits outgroup derogation. The current research sought
to extend this literature by exploring how dominant group identification affects the
dehumanization of outgroups. In study 1, White men who were primed with photos of White
people from the 1950s attributed fewer secondary emotions to the Black target relative to the
White target. The fact that racial identity salience did not affect secondary emotion attribution
across targets for Black participants in study 4 suggests that social identities that connote social
power are responsible for this bias.
Taken together, these results provide at least preliminary evidence suggesting that the
activation of dominant identities, especially on the basis of race, facilitate the dehumanization of
outgroup members. This interpretation has the potential to explain the recent increase in racial
tensions in this country; the proliferation of imagery and messages by the current administration
depicting Whites as “true” Americans prompt these individuals to view people of color as less
human, perpetuating racial prejudice. Therefore, even though White individuals may not be
aware of this tendency, the activation of their dominant identity may lead to perceptions
consistent with White supremacy.
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Table 1
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable

M

SD

α

Primary Emotions

1.86

0.51

.62

Secondary Emotions

2.06

0.51

.44

Positive Emotions

1.49

0.59

.84

Negative Emotions

2.44

0.77

.78

Primary Positive Emotions

1.40

0.62

.84

Primary Negative Emotions

2.31

0.86

.73

Secondary Positive Emotions

1.58

0.66

.61

Secondary Negative Emotions

2.57

0.82

.51

Hostility

3.27

1.40

--

Composite Emotion

1.98

0.55

.73

Ethnic Identity

3.79

0.97

--
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Table 2
Study 1 Correlations between Emotion Categories
Emotion Type

1.

1. Primary
Positive
Emotions

--

2. Primary
Negative
Emotions

-.080

3. Secondary
Positive
Emotions

.714**

.062

--

4. Secondary
Negative
Emotions

-.190*

.679**

-.046

Note. *< .05, **<.01

2.

3.

4.

--

--
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Table 3
Study 1 Gender X Condition Interaction by Emotion Type
Men
Control
Prime

Women
White
Prime

Control
Prime

Men

Women

White
Prime

White
Target

Black
Target

White
Target

Black
Target

Condition X Gender
Interaction

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

F

p

Emotion

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Primary

2.01 (.63) 1.83 (.44)

1.80 (.46)

1.81 (.49)

1.86 (.43)

2.00 (.64)

1.90 (.51)

1.72 (.43)

3.48

.064^

Secondary

2.24 (.60) 2.06 (.47)

2.01 (.47)

2.03 (.51)

2.17 (.48)

2.15 (.61)

2.09 (.50)

1.95 (.47)

4.01

.047*

Positive

1.75 (.80) 1.47 (.50)

1.45 (.55)

1.37 (.45)

1.53 (.54)

1.69 (.80)

1.47 (.61)

1.35 (.38)

2.83

.095^

Negative

2.51 (.85) 2.42 (.77)

2.35 (.71)

2.49 (.76)

2.50 (.83)

2.45 (.86)

2.52 (.82)

2.32 (.63)

1.58

.211

Primary
Positive

1.61 (.83)

1.42 (.57)

1.37 (.64)

1.28 (.40)

1.41 (.53)

1.62 (.85)

1.39 (.65)

1.26 (.38)

3.21

.075*

Primary
Negative

2.42 (.92)

2.24 (.81)

2.22 (.85)

2.36 (.88)

2.30 (.85)

2.37 (.90)

2.41 (.96)

2.17 (.76)

0.80

.374

Secondary
Positive

1.88 (.88) 1.51 (.52)

1.53 (.60)

1.45 (.55)

1.65 (.66)

1.77 (.84)

1.54 (.66)

1.43 (.47)

1.74

.189

Secondary
Negative

2.60 (.94) 2.61 (.84)

2.49 (.75)

2.61 (.82)

2.70 (.92)

2.53 (.87)

2.63 (.84)

2.55 (.78)

2.02

.158

Composite

2.07 (.61) 1.89 (.41)

1.85 (.42)

1.87 (.45)

1.94 (.41)

2.03 (.62)

1.95 (.46)

1.77 (.40)

4.15

.044*

Note. ^ < .10, *< .05; N = 135 (Men = 52, Women = 93)
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Table 4
Study 1 Primary Emotion Simple Slope Statistics by Gender
Target Type
White
Black
Prime Type
M
SD
M
SD
Men
Control Prime
1.76
0.39
2.15
0.70
White Identity Prime 1.93
0.46
1.70
0.48
t-statistic
-0.81
2.30
p-value
0.42
0.02*
Women
Control Prime
1.90
0.52
1.69
0.38
White Identity Prime 1.90
0.51
1.74
0.48
t-statistic
0.30
-0.37
p-value
0.99
0.72
Note. ^ < .10, *< .05; N = 135 (Men = 52, Women = 93)

t-statistic

p-value

-1.98
1.10

0.05*
0.27

1.34
0.36

0.18
0.32
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Table 5
Study 1 Positive Emotion Simple Slope Statistics by Gender
Target Type
White
Black
Prime Type
M
SD
M
SD
Men
Control Prime
1.53
0.48
1.86
0.92
White Identity Prime 1.54
0.60
1.38
0.36
t-statistic
-0.05
2.15
p-value
0.96
0.03*
Women
Control Prime
1.56
0.69
1.34
0.34
White Identity Prime 1.38
0.50
1.36
0.41
t-statistic
-0.31
-0.37
p-value
0.99
0.72
Note. ^ < .10, *< .05; N = 135 (Men = 52, Women = 93)

t-statistic

p-value

-1.48
0.67

0.14
0.50

1.34
1.01

0.18
0.32
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Table 6
Study 1 Primary Positive Emotion Simple Slope Statistics by Gender

Prime Type
Control Prime
White Identity
Prime
t-statistic
p-value

Target Type
White
Black
M
SD
M
SD
Men
1.33
0.33
1.76
0.98
1.48
0.64
1.35
0.47
-0.61
0.55
Women
0.82
1.25
0.40
1.27

t-statistic

p-value

-1.83
0.51

0.07^
0.61

1.11
0.08

0.18
0.94

1.73
0.09^

Control Prime
1.49
0.35
White Identity
1.29
0.41
Prime
t-statistic
1.05
-0.12
p-value
0.30
0.90
Note. ^ < .10, *< .05; N = 135 (Men = 52, Women = 93)
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Table 7
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable

M

SD

α

Primary Emotions

2.09

0.65

.75

Secondary Emotions

2.23

0.70

.63

Positive Emotions

1.95

0.82

.90

Negative Emotions

2.36

0.79

.81

Primary Positive Emotions

1.83

0.91

.91

Primary Negative Emotions

2.35

0.84

.75

Secondary Positive Emotions

2.08

0.87

.73

Secondary Negative Emotions

2.37

0.85

.59

Hostility

3.11

1.38

--

Composite Emotion

2.16

0.64

.83

Ethnic Identity

3.95

0.79

--
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Table 8
Study 2 Correlations between Emotion Categories
Emotion Type

1.

1. Primary
Positive
Emotions

--

2. Primary
Negative
Emotions

.118

3. Secondary
Positive
Emotions

.697**

.333**

--

4. Secondary
Negative
Emotions

-.090

.754**

.314**

Note. *< .05, **<.01

2.

3.

4.

--

--
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Table 9
Study 2 T-test Statistics for Target Type
White
Target
Emotion Type
M
SD
Primary~
2.10
0.58

Black
Target
M
2.14

SD
0.82

t
-0.43

p
.671

Secondary~

2.30

0.58

2.18

0.76

1.23

.220

Positive

1.79

0.80

2.33

0.97

-4.03

.000**

Negative~

2.61

0.65

1.99

0.88

5.23

.000**

Primary Positive

1.72

0.88

2.36

1.09

-4.37

.000**

Primary Negative~

2.48

0.73

1.93

0.95

4.31

.000**

Secondary Positive

1.87

0.81

2.30

0.95

-3.24

.001**

Secondary
Negative~

2.73

0.73

2.06

0.93

5.34

.000**

Hostile~

3.29

1.36

2.00

1.36

6.33

.000**

Note. ~connotes equal variances not assumed; **<.01; N = 179
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Table 10
Study 3 Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable

M

SD

α

Primary Emotions

2.08

0.56

.64

Secondary Emotions

2.26

0.57

.54

Positive Emotions

1.75

0.78

.90

Negative Emotions

2.59

0.74

.78

Primary Positive Emotions

1.63

0.79

.86

Primary Negative Emotions

2.53

0.85

.71

Secondary Positive Emotions

1.87

0.85

.80

Secondary Negative Emotions

2.65

0.82

.59

Hostility

3.11

1.38

--

Composite Emotion

2.17

0.52

.77

Gender Identity

4.09

0.60

--
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Table 11
Study 3 Correlations between Emotion Categories
Emotion Type

1.

1. Primary
Positive
Emotions

--

2. Primary
Negative
Emotions

-.048

3. Secondary
Positive
Emotions

.822**

4. Secondary
Negative
Emotions

-.063

Note. *< .05, **<.01

2.

3.

4.

--

-.037

--

.585**

.365**

--
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Table 12
Study 3 T-test Statistics Regarding Emotion Attribution by Prime Type
Control
White Man Identity
Prime
Prime
Emotion Type
M
SD
M
SD
t
Primary
1.98
0.53
2.18
0.58
-1.95

p
.053

Secondary

2.16

0.54

2.36

0.58

-2.08

.040*

Positive~

1.58

0.65

1.91

0.87

-2.47

.015*

Negative

2.56

0.75

2.62

0.74

-0.49

.628

Primary Positive~

1.44

0.57

1.82

0.91

-2.87

.005

Primary Negative

2.53

0.90

2.53

0.80

0.01

.990

Secondary Positive

1.73

0.78

2.01

0.90

-1.87

.064

Secondary Negative

2.58

0.80

2.71

0.85

-0.89

.373

Hostile~

3.16

1.42

3.34

1.39

-0.75

.456

Note. ~connotes equal variances not assumed; *< .05, **<.01; N = 130
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Table 13
Study 4 Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable

M

SD

α

Primary Emotions

2.09

0.65

.71

Secondary Emotions

2.23

0.70

.70

Positive Emotions

1.95

0.82

.87

Negative Emotions

2.36

0.79

.80

Primary Positive Emotions

1.83

0.91

.87

Primary Negative Emotions

2.35

0.84

.65

Secondary Positive Emotions

2.08

0.87

.70

Secondary Negative Emotions

2.37

0.85

.59

Hostility

3.11

1.38

--

Composite Emotion

2.16

0.64

.83

Ethnic Identity

3.95

0.79

--
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Table 14
Study 4 Correlations between Emotion Categories
Emotion Type

1.

1. Primary
Positive
Emotions

--

2. Primary
Negative
Emotions

.118

3. Secondary
Positive
Emotions

.697**

.333**

--

4. Secondary
Negative
Emotions

-.090

.754**

.314**

Note. *< .05, **<.01

2.

3.

4.

--

--
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Table 15
Study 5 Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable

M

SD

α

Primary Emotions

1.79

0.52

.62

Secondary Emotions

1.97

0.49

.46

Positive Emotions

1.44

0.56

.84

Negative Emotions

2.32

0.72

.74

Primary Positive Emotions

1.39

0.69

.83

Primary Negative Emotions

2.20

0.87

.73

Secondary Positive Emotions

1.49

0.58

.61

Secondary Negative Emotions

2.45

0.77

.45

Hostility

3.26

1.89

--

Composite Emotion

2.17

0.52

.72

Gender Identity

3.96

0.63

--
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Table 16
Study 5 Correlations between Emotion Categories
Emotion Type

1.

1. Primary
Positive
Emotions

--

2. Primary
Negative
Emotions

-.007

3. Secondary
Positive
Emotions

.802**

4. Secondary
Negative
Emotions

-.065

Note. *< .05, **<.01

2.

3.

4.

--

.117

--

.568**

.059

--
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Table 17
Study 5 T-test Statistics Regarding Emotion Attribution by Target Type
White Man
White Woman
Target
Target
Emotion Type
M
SD
M
SD
t
Primary
1.76
0.56
1.93
0.58
-2.10

p
.037*

Secondary

1.97

0.55

2.02

0.52

-0.58

.563

Positive~

1.36

0.59

1.65

0.74

-3.10

.002*

Negative

2.37

0.71

2.29

0.76

0.79

.429

Primary Positive~

1.30

0.60

1.64

0.85

-3.35

.001**

Primary Negative

2.22

0.83

2.21

0.93

0.09

.925

Secondary Positive

1.43

0.64

1.66

0.71

-2.51

.013*

Secondary Negative

2.52

0.75

2.37

0.80

1.39

.165

Hostile~

3.48

1.44

3.80

1.39

-0.38

.702

Note. ~connotes equal variances not assumed; *< .05, **<.01; N = 146
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2.5

Secondary Emotions

2

1.5
Control Prime
White Prime

1

0.5

0
White Target

Black Target

Figure 1
Study 1 Secondary Emotion Attribution by Condition for Men

66

2.15
2.1

Secondary Emotions

2.05
2
Control Prime

1.95

White Prime
1.9
1.85
1.8
1.75
White Target

Black Target

Figure 2
Study 1 Secondary Emotion Attribution by Condition for Women

67

2.4
2.2

Primary Emotions

2
1.8
Control Prime
1.6

White Prime

1.4
1.2
1
White Target

Black Target

Figure 3
Study 1 Primary Emotion Attribution by Condition for Men
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Figure 4
Study 1 Primary Emotion Attribution by Condition for Women
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Figure 5
Study 1 Positive Emotion Attribution by Condition for Men
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Figure 6
Study 1 Positive Emotion Attribution by Condition for Women
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Figure 7
Study 1 Primary Positive Emotion Attribution by Condition for Men
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Figure 8
Study 1 Primary Positive Emotion Attribution by Condition for Women
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Figure 9
Study 4 Prime by Target Interaction for Primary Positive Emotions
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Figure 10
Study 4 Prime by Target Interaction for Primary Positive Emotions for Men
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Figure 11
Study 4 Prime by Target Interaction for Primary Positive Emotions for Women
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Appendix A
Control Prime Stimuli for Studies 1-5
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Appendix B
White Identity Prime Stimuli for Study 1
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Appendix C
White Man Identity Prime Stimuli for Studies 2 and 3
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Appendix D
Black Identity Prime Stimuli for Study 4
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Appendix E
White Woman Identity Prime Stimuli for Study 5
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Appendix F
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then circle the appropriate number next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel
this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale provided to record
your answers.
1) Very slightly or not at all

2) A little

3) Moderately

4) Quite a bit

5) Extremely

1. Attentive

1

2

3

4

5

2. Strong

1

2

3

4

5

3. Irritable

1

2

3

4

5

4. Inspired

1

2

3

4

5

5. Afraid

1

2

3

4

5

6. Alert

1

2

3

4

5

7. Upset

1

2

3

4

5

8. Active

1

2

3

4

5

9. Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

10. Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

11. Excited

1

2

3

4

5

12. Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

13. Proud

1

2

3

4

5

14. Jittery

1

2

3

4

5

15. Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

16. Scared

1

2

3

4

5

17. Enthusiastic

1

2

3

4

5

18. Distressed

1

2

3

4

5

19. Determined

1

2

3

4

5
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20. Interested

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix G
Neoliberal Beliefs Inventory (NBI; Bay-Cheng, Fitz, Alizaga & Zucker, 2015)
For the following items please indicate to what degree you agree/disagree with each statement.
1)Strongly Disagree

2)Disagree

3)Neither Disagree nor Agree

4)Agree

5) Strongly Agree

1. Affirmative action is an outdated policy now that people are generally treated as equals.
2. Discrimination does not exist today to such a degree that affirmative action policies are
necessary.
3. Affirmative action does not help eradicate discrimination. Instead it exacerbates it by
promoting people on the basis of minority status instead of merit.
4. Affirmative action is a problem because it treats people unequally.
5. People who complain about discrimination are often just blaming other people for their own
problems.
6. I think people imagine more barriers, such as discrimination, than actually exist.
7. Based on my own experience and the people around me, it’s hard for me to feel sorry for
people who complain about discrimination.
8. People should be allowed to compete to ensure that the best person wins.
9. Being competitive is part of human nature.
10. Competition is a good way to discover and motivate the best people.
11. Shielding children from competition does not prepare them for adulthood.
12. Fairness means letting people have equal opportunity, not guaranteeing equal outcome.
13. To get ahead in the world, people have to depend on themselves more than anyone else.
14. Anybody can get ahead in the world if they learn to play the game.
15. Any goal can be achieved with enough hard work and talent.
16. Right now, pretty much all Americans are free to live any kind of life they want.
17. When it comes to challenges like discrimination, individuals just have to be tough enough to
overcome them.
18. I’ve benefited from working hard, so there’s no reason others can’t.

89
19. If you’re smart and strong enough, discrimination won’t hold you back.
20. A person’s success in life is determined more by his or her personal efforts than by society.
21. Anyone who is willing to work hard can be successful in America.
22. A problem with government social programs is that they get in the way of personal freedom.
23. The government is inefficient, and therefore should not interfere in the private sector.
24. The government often hurts individual ambition when it interferes.
25. The government does not have a right to take what I earn and give it to someone else.
26. Social programs sponsored by the government provide false incentives and unearned
rewards.
27. It’s right for the government to get involved in individuals’ lives. (R)
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Appendix H
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA; Zakrisson, 2005)
For the following items please indicate to what degree you agree/disagree with each statement.
1)Strongly Disagree

2)Disagree

3)Neither Disagree nor Agree

4)Agree

5) Strongly Agree

1. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents
prevailing in society today.
2. Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against traditional
ways, even if this upsets many people.
3. The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live.
4. Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for untraditional
values and opinions.
5. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too
late, violations must be punished.
6. The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than a strong
leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous.
7. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get hold of
destructive and disgusting material.
8. Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal way of
living’’.
9. Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at the same
time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it.
10. People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to develop
their own moral standards.
11. There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; the society ought to stop them.
12. It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it.
13. Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality, in order to uphold
law and order.
14. The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated with
reason and humanity.
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15. If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that
poisons our country from within.
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